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Abstract:  In what follows I shall argue that an important notion of reduction 
depends on a four-place relation holding between expressions, concepts, 
properties, and events or states of affairs. I define this notion and argue 
against alternative accounts that are based on syntactic features of 
theories. Whilst these latter attempts fail to deliver a satisfactory 
explanation of why a certain theory or a certain expression reduces to 
another, the former can give a complete explanation of why, say, ‛human 
pain’ reduces to ‛C-fiber stimulation’ (if it reduces at all) or why the mind 
reduces to the physical. I briefly sketch the difference between the 
semantic approach that I favor, which is based on a particular notion of 
hyper-intensions, and classical model-theoretic versions of reduction.  
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Preliminary 
 
In this paper, I shall discuss a particular concept of reduction, namely the 
concept of reduction that seems to underlie the following prominent claim: 
The mind reduces to the physical. What exactly this thesis states is a debated 
issue. The pertinent notion of reduction is often illustrated by way of 
examples. Here is one of them:  
 
- Human pain reduces to C-fibre-stimulation.  
 
Another example for this sort of reduction can be found in Fodor (1981, p. 
150) and Kim (1993, p. 333): 
 
- Water reduces to H2O.  
 
I shall use these examples as paradigmatic cases of reductionist claims, and 
I shall take their truth for granted.  
Taking these examples as paradigmatic cases for reductionist claims, I 
restrict my use of the term ‛reduction’ to the way it is used in these cases. 
Other notions will be taken into account only if they seem to be capable of 
illuminating the notion of reduction I am interested in here. ‛The reduces-
to-relation’ refers to the relation of reduction corresponding to this notion 
(henceforth: ‛reduction-relation’)´.  
It will turn out that the notion of reduction is primarily a notion of a certain 
sort of explanation-improvement. This is a familiar point. Nevertheless, 
many theories according to which the reduction-relation is an explanation-
relation face the problem of trying to spell out the difference between 
reduced and reducing level or theory either in terms of syntactic relations 
or in terms of properties or phenomena, thus neglecting the fact that 
explanations are sensitive to conceptual contents of the sentences being 
connected by the binary-connective ‛because’. I shall argue that reduction is 
primarily concerned with levels of descriptions and that levels of 
descriptions are levels of conceptual contents, rather than levels of 
properties, phenomena, events, or states of affairs. It will turn out that the 
reduction-relation is a four-place relation holding between expressions, 
conceptual contents, properties and events or states of affairs. 
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Philosophers have investigated notions of reduction from different angles. 
Some are interested in formal relations holding between theories, some are 
interested in criteria for an appropriate formalization of historical theory-
succession. Others hope to define an ontological hierarchy according to 
which our world is organized using the notion of reduction. These latter 
philosophers often start with an intuitively appealing slogan, such as “If Xs 
are reduced, or reducible, to Ys, there are no Xs over and above Ys” (cf. Kim 
2006, p 275 f. For a comment on this slogan, see below, footnote 6), and then 
try to give a more formal account of what it states. Despite these different 
interests, philosophers of mind, who belong to the camp of the latter, 
sometimes refer to formal approaches to reduction in order to explicate 
their notion of reduction (cf. Kim 1993, Crane 2001 (see below)).  
In what follows, I shall focus on the most influential approaches to theory-
reduction – syntactic and certain semantic approaches – and try to answer 
the following question: Can these approaches help to clarify the notion of 
reduction we are interested in here? As we shall see, these approaches face 
a serious problem: They are incapable of explaining what reduction 
consists in. This is partly due to the fact that they do not furnish us with the 
equipment we need to pick out the relevant entities – that is: conceptual 
contents. 1 
The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, I will argue that syntax-based 
accounts of reduction lack any explanatory power concerning the question 
what reduction consists in (Part 1). I will then argue that many theories 
reduce to other theories in virtue of relations holding between conceptual 
contents that are expressed by a theory’s elements, properties and events or 
states of affairs (Part 2). In order to do so, I define a notion of synonymy 
that enables us to individuate conceptual contents. In the last section, I will 
compare the account presented below to classical semantic (model-
theoretic) views of intertheoretic reduction and briefly explain why these 
latter accounts fail (Part 3). I finish by sketching an alternative way of 
modelling a theory’s semantics, delivering individuation-criteria for 
conceptual contents or hyper-intensions that are based on set-theoretical 
notions.  
Let me mention that I do not aim at defining a historical notion of reduction 
which seems to underlie many versions of intra-level reduction. The 
                                                     
1 Since the account I argue for in this paper is, in a sense, a semantic account, too, I 
distinguish between classical semantic approaches and non-classical approaches. 
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examples I discuss are standard examples for reduction taken from the 
Philosophy of Mind debates. Hence, we will primarily be concerned with 
reduction of expressions of (or: explanations formulated in) ordinary 
language (e.g. folk psychology) to expressions of (or: explanations 
formulated in) scientific language, and with reduction of the corresponding 
theories.  
 
 
1. Failing to answer the why-question  
  
Ernest Nagel developed an influential model of inter-theoretic reduction, 
describing the goal of such reduction as follows:  
 
Reduction … is the explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established 
in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for 
some other domain. (Nagel 1961, p. 338) 
 
According to Nagel, a theory R (reduced theory) reduces to a theory B (base 
theory) iff there are some bridge-principles C, delivering criteria to map 
expressions of A onto expressions of B, such that B and C together 
(syntactically) entail A (ibid.). Note that this is a very brief version that is in 
need of a substantial refinement: According to the above definition, every 
theory (trivially) reduces to itself and every theory reduces to every 
necessarily false theory. But this sketch will suffice to give an idea of what 
syntactic theory reduction consists in. Even though this conception has 
been attacked for several reasons that I am not discussing here (cf. Putnam 
1975, Fodor 1974), many contemporary reductionists develop their models 
in Nagel’s spirit (cf. Schaffner 1993, Hooker 1981, Bickle 1998). These 
attempts have in common that they (i) take theories to be (derivatively) 
syntactically structured entities, i.e., sets of sentences, and, therefore, (ii) 
take theory reduction to be concerned with relations that are based on 
syntactic properties. Furthermore, if the definitions delivered by these 
accounts are supposed to illuminate what reduction consists in, it must be 
possible to explain why certain theories reduce to other theories referring to 
these definitions. The main problem is that these approaches to reduction 
fail to meet this criterion, i.e.: They are incapable of explaining what 
reduction consists in. 
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My argument is based on a simple observation: According to every non-
semantic version of inter-theoretic reduction, the question of why a theory 
Τ reduces to another theory Τ* is answered by referring to syntactic 
properties. Consider the following passage in which Jerry Fodor sums up 
what he takes to be the core idea of Nagel-style reduction: 
 
[T}heories in whose laws the expression ‛water’ (or its cognates) occurs will reduce 
to chemistry only if (a’) chemistry contains some expressions other than ‛water’ 
(say ‛H2O’) such that (b’) ‛(x) (x is water if x is H2O)’ expresses a law. (Fodor 1981, 
p. 150) 
 
Now, let us turn to the why-question. We can ask: Why does Τ reduce to 
Τ*? All that the Nagelian theorist can do in reply is to point to syntactic 
features of Τ, Τ*, and, according to some versions of inter-theoretic 
reduction, to bridge principles. But the syntactic features are not of interest 
in this context. To give an example: Let us assume that (human) pain is 
identical to C-fibre stimulation. If I ask why pain-science reduces to C-fibre-
stimulation-science and you tell me something about the syntactic 
properties of ‛pain’, ‛C-fibre stimulation’ and general claims of the form 
‛For every F, F is G (and, maybe, vice versa)’, I would be rather astonished. 
Putting the question this way, we do not want to know anything about 
syntactic entities like ‛pain’ or about properties these entities have in virtue 
of having their syntactic properties – which is obviously all that can be 
explained by referring to the entity’s syntactic properties. Thus, the 
objection is that syntactic deduction is explanatorily irrelevant for 
understanding reduction (in the sense of `reduction´ we are interested in 
here). Therefore, syntax-based approaches to the notion of reduction cannot 
deliver illuminating definitions. Therefore, Nagel’s intuition that reduction 
is concerned with the explanation of one theory by another, and that this 
sort of explanation has got something to do with syntactic deduction, is not 
compatible with the notion of reduction underlying our paradigmatic 
cases.  
The notion of a bridge-principle in fact goes beyond considerations of mere 
syntactic reduction. Bridge-principles seem to be able to furnish us with the 
relevant information concerning the facts in virtue of which a certain 
theory reduces to another theory. But they do not do so in virtue of their 
syntactic structure, but rather in virtue of their semantics. Semantic 
accounts of the notion of reduction (including the version I shall outline 
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below) can be read as promoting criteria, which bridge-principles have to 
meet. If so, bridge-principles tell us something about the semantic values of 
‛human pain’ and ‛C-fibre-stimulation’, and about relations holding 
between these semantic values. If this is correct, then syntactic entities 
reduce only derivatively in the sense that they reduce in virtue of their 
semantics. Consequently, no satisfactory explanation of why a theory 
reduces to another can be gained from purely syntactic accounts.2  
Nevertheless, the idea that reduction is concerned with syntactic entities 
has, at least prima facie, its virtues: It seems to perfectly match the 
observation that if A reduces to B, then ‛A’ is to be replaced by ‛B’, at least 
in some contexts. But the fact that we cannot explain why A reduces to B on 
the basis of syntactic properties alone seems to show that expression-
replacement can be subsumed under the concept of reduction only in a 
derivative sense.  
What, then, is reduction primarily concerned with, if not with syntactic 
entities? Is it concerned with the objects of the theory? This is what 
Jaegwon Kim seems to suggest when introducing his model of functional 
reduction (cf. Kim 1993). In this case, the bridge-principle(-analogue)s tell 
us that a certain species or system bound (human…) kind (pain) is 
functionally equivalent to – and, according to a certain view of property- or 
kind-individuation, thereby identical to – a kind being described in a 
different vocabulary (‛C-fibre stimulation’). Yet, identity and functional 
equivalence are symmetric relations, whilst the reduction-relation is 
asymmetric. Furthermore, when the project of reduction (i.e.: local 
reduction) really starts and the considerations about property-
individuation, functional roles and conceptual analysis are put aside, Kim’s 
account is to be understood in the Nagelian way (cf. Kim 1993, p. 328).3  
 
2. An alternative view 
In order to establish an alternative view, let me start from the notion of a 
cognate mentioned in the Fodor-citation above and state two observations. 
Similar to the aforementioned problem concerning the explanatory power 
of syntactic properties in contexts concerning reduction, we have to answer 
                                                     
2 For a similar, though not identical worry see (Moulines 1984, p.55).  
3 For a detailed discussion of whether or not Kim’s version of reduction is Nagelian 
in nature, see Marras (2002&2006). 
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the question of why cognates of ‛water’ should be replaced by ‛H2O’ in the 
pertinent case.  
The notion of a cognate is a semantic notion. I take Fodor to mean that 
‛water’ and its French counterpart ‛eau’ are cognates. According to another 
reading, ‛water’ and ‛iron’ on the one hand and ‛H2O’ and ‛Fe’ on the other 
count as cognates. Which reading Fodor actually intended is not necessary 
to establish; both aspects are interesting, I will now focus on the first one. 
Obviously, no syntactic property will deliver an illuminating criterion for 
what makes an expression a cognate of another expression. Nor will an 
ontological claim about (the property of being/the substance/the natural 
kind) water and (the property of being/the substance/the natural kind) 
H2O do. After all, the property of being water is identical to the property of 
being H2O – at least this is what the reductionist should believe. If these 
properties are identical, then the difference between water and H2O cannot 
be explained by referring to the property that both terms can be used to 
ascribe. To repeat: Functional equivalence and identity are symmetric 
relations, whilst the reduction-relation is asymmetric. This observation has 
forced some philosophers to distinguish between ontological and 
explanatory aspects of reduction, or between two sorts of reduction. Let us 
look at an example. Having described reduction as being concerned with 
ontological concerns, Tim Crane states:  
 
What reduction needs, in addition, is the idea that the ‛reduced phenomenon’ is 
made more comprehensible or intelligible by being shown to be identical with the 
‛reducing phenomenon’. (Crane 2001, p. 54) 
 
Unfortunately, when Crane briefly mentions how this idea of making 
things more comprehensible is to be spelled out, he merely repeats the 
Nagelian intuition that reduction is concerned with explaining one theory 
by another (ibid, p. 55). 
So, why are ‛water’ and ‛eau’ cognates? Well, ‛water’ and ‛eau’ express the 
same concept and are cognates in this respect. Put differently: They are 
synonymous. The first observation can be stated as follows: If ‛water’ 
(derivatively) reduces to ‛H2O’, then ‛eau’ reduces to ‛H2O’. (For the sake of 
clarity, I ignore questions concerning language-identity as a potential 
necessary condition for synonymy, which poses a mere technical problem.) 
We can generalize: 
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(Observation A)  
If 'water' reduces to 'H2O' then any expression being synonymous to 'water' reduces to any 
expression being synonymous to 'H2O' (and to 'H2O').  
 
The second observation concerns the relation between expression-
replacement of synonymous expressions and explanations of why these 
replacements count as reduction. Let us assume that we already know why 
‛water’ reduces to ‛H2O’, say, in virtue of p. Being able to give this 
explanation, we obviously have an appropriate explanation for why any 
expression being synonymous to ‛water’ reduces to any expression being 
synonymous to ‛H2O’ and to ‛H2O’, and why ‛water’ also reduces to any 
expression being synonymous to ‛H2O’; this is the case in virtue of p. So, the 
second observation is this:   
 
(Observation B) 
If 'water' reduces to 'H2O' then any expression being synonymous to 'water' reduces to 
any expression being synonymous to 'H2O' and to 'H2O’ for the same reason 'water' 
reduces to 'H2O'.  
 
Synonymy is defined on the level of conceptual content, neither on the level 
of properties or natural kinds – these being the referents of our sense-
bearing expressions – nor on the level of syntax. Accordingly, ‛water’ and 
its cognates differ from ‛H2O’ on the level of conceptual contents. Since 
ordinary intensions (functions from possible worlds to extensions) do not 
help specifying the relevant level – intensions are individuated too coarsely 
–, I shall use the term ‛hyper-intensions’ in order to refer to these 
conceptual contents.  
Talking about hyper-intensions, one should be able to specify the identity-
conditions of conceptual contents. Before I go on, I will define a notion of 
synonymy. In the last section, I shall briefly outline a more formal and 
more informative way that enables us to distinguish between different 
conceptual contents. For the moment, all we need is a pre-theoretic grasp of 
the notion of a conceptual content.  
Synonymous expressions are cognitively equivalent. I follow Künne in 
putting the notion of Fregean equipollence (Frege (1969), p. 213) this way 
(every variable ranges over individuals):  
 
(CognE)  
Two sentences are cognitively equivalent iff, for any context x, nobody who fully 
understands them can take one of them to express a truth with respect to c without 
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immediately being ready to take the other to express a truth with respect to c as well. 
(Künne 2003, p. 42 f.) 
 
Künne argues correctly that (CognE) does not furnish us with a sufficient 
condition for sameness of senses of sentences. Every n-tuple of evidently 
true sentences is such that its members are cognitively equivalent without 
thereby expressing the same proposition. But what distinguishes the sense 
of ‛2+2 = 4’ from the sense of ‛Napoleon is a table or Napoleon is not a 
table’? Well, its constituents. But this will not help, because (i) ‛42 =16’and 
‛24=16’ have the same constituents (even though they are structured 
differently), they are cognitively equivalent and nevertheless express 
different thoughts, and (ii) talk about constituents requires an idea of how 
constituents are to be individuated. 
Putting this problem aside for a moment, I will now outline an alternative 
idea – that the sameness of sense is mimicked on the level of sense-grasping 
physical entities. The physical state (-type) a person is in grasping a sense 
of a sentence is sufficient (even though presumably not necessary) for 
grasping that sense, given that determinism is correct and given a certain 
historical and nomological background. So, two sentences express the same 
sense iff a person, when grasping the content of one of these sentences, 
could have been (partly) in the same physical state when grasping the 
content of the other sentence. This tells us, in a somewhat idealized way, 
what it is for someone to grasp the same content in possibly different 
situations. Note that ‛content’ is ambiguous. According to one reading, it is 
lexical meaning that ‛content’ refers to. Context sensitive expressions have 
the same content without their tokens being necessarily synonymous. 
Therefore, we must additionally specify what kind of content we want to 
focus on. (CognE) excludes the possibility of classifying sentences having 
merely the same lexical meaning as being synonymous, because it 
introduces the notion of truth. Therefore, we should try to incorporate the 
notion of truth to get a proper definition of synonymy: 
 
(SynDef) 
Sentence x is synonymous to sentence y iff 
there is a possible concept-grasping entity e having a physical basis, a state b, a time t, a 
deterministic world w and another deterministic world w* such that  
e is in b at t in w & e thereby believes that the content of x is true & 
e is in b at t in w & e thereby believes that the content of y is true & 
w and w* are law- and history-indistinguishable up to t (except features concerning the 
possibility of being related to different expressions at t).  
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Here, we have fixed the notion of synonymy of sentences. Two non-
sentential expressions are synonymous iff for every sentence forming 
operator working on these expressions, the resulting sentences are 
synonymous according to (SynDef).4  
Now, let us come back to reduction. In order to answer the question why, 
say, water reduces to H2O, we should have a closer look at the conceptual 
level, for it is at this level that the relevant relations between ‛water’ and, 
say, ‛eau’ on the one hand, and ‛water’ and ‛H2O’ on the other are to be 
found. As (Observation B) points out: Since identity of the hyper-intensions 
of two terms suffices for reducing for the same reason (if these terms actually 
reduce to other terms) it is the level of conceptual contents that should be 
investigated to derive an appropriate definition of reduction. I think that 
this can be connected to the idea that reductions improve 
comprehensibility or intelligibility.  
The idea of an alternative explanation of intertheoretical reduction is easy 
to sketch: Different conceptual contents present us with things differently, 
and sometimes, two conceptual contents present us with the same thing in 
different ways. The way the concept of water presents us with water is 
fundamentally different from the way the concept of H2O presents us with 
water. This tells us in which respect two linguistic entities have to differ in 
order to reduce. But it does not yet tell us anything about the direction of 
the reduction-relation. So, this is my suggestion:  
Some ways of presenting a thing might be more appropriate than others. 
The notion of appropriateness seems to require something with respect to 
which it can be truthfully attributed, that is: it needs a context. The basic 
idea is that, in a certain context, the notion of H2O is more appropriate than the 
notion of water. This tentative characterization delivers a sound picture of 
reductionist claims, like: (The surface property of being) water reduces to (the 
chemical property of being) H2O (an example of this kind can be found in 
Levine 1993, 131, f.), or human pain reduces to c-fibre stimulation. According to 
folk-chemistry, we can explain why mosquito larvae sink if we add 
washing-up liquid to the water they swim in: because the surface energy 
diminishes, and it was the surface energy that prevented the mosquito 
larvae from sinking. In chemistry we can explain events of the same kind 
                                                     
4 I take this to follow from the notions of synonymy, concept-grasping physical entities and 
determinism.  
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talking about them as destruction of hydrogen bonds and about the 
occurrence of this destruction as being causally linked to the chemical 
structure of water and to the chemical structure of washing-up liquid. We 
change the way we talk about the same things, and science (partly) differs 
from ordinary language in that it delivers explanations explicitly or 
implicitly mentioning properties that are causally relevant for the events or 
states of affairs the occurrence of which we try to explain. For example, the 
property of having a hydrogen-molecule as a constituent is, so to speak, 
implicitly mentioned using the expression ‛H2O’ in current English. This 
provides a hint for specifying what kinds of context are relevant: ‛Water’ 
reduces to ‛H2O’ with respect to causal events, since the concept of H2O 
presents us with water as having certain causally relevant properties, 
properties that are not picked out by the concept of water. Some concepts 
are transparent with respect to certain phenomena in that they pick out 
properties that are causally, or, more generally, explanatorily relevant with 
respect to these phenomena. Thus, H2O is said to be effected by washing-
up liquid in a certain way in virtue of having the property of being 
composed of oxygen and hydrogen. Accordingly, reduction seems to be a 
certain sort of explanation improvement. How can this idea be shaped 
more precisely?  
We should take into account that reductionists claim that the reducing 
predicates (as parts of a theory) have the same intension the reduced 
predicates have, or, similarly, that the corresponding natural kind terms, 
like ‛water’ and ‛H2O’ have the same intension. Generalizing, we can put 
the idea of reduction as explanation improvement as follows: If two 
concepts A (concept of H2O) and B (concept of Water) as wholes pick out 
the same property (property of being water) and if A is more transparent 
than B with respect to an event-type E (formation/destruction of hydrogen 
bonds), then B is to be replaced by A with respect to E.  
The notion of transparency can be defined defining the notion of relevance of 
a property with respect to an event-type: 
  
(RelDef.) 
Property p is relevant for e iff  
events of type e take place at least sometimes in virtue of an instance of p.  
 
The relation in virtue of which the explanation relation holds can be causal 
in nature, but this is not necessarily the case. Consider a monist who 
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believes that the physical reduces to the mental. I think that we should take 
this to be a consistent belief – and even if it is inconsistent, it is not 
inconsistent in virtue of the notion of reduction employed here. But it 
would turn out to be inconsistent, if the notion of reduction were applicable 
only in cases where the criteria of appropriateness of a concept require 
causal relations between the properties and events or states of affairs that 
are to be explained. Clearly, our monist would not subscribe to the thesis 
that the causal relations out there are basic, but rather that some mental 
relations are basic. In a sense, the notion of reduction is topic-neutral.  
Let me describe the relevant relation of picking out which holds between 
concepts and properties this way:  
 
(ConcPropDef.) 
The sense x of expression y picks out property p iff there is a concept x* being a (proper or 
improper) constituent of x such that for every expression y* expressing x* the result of 
applying the operator ‛the property of being (an) _’ to y* refers to p.  
 
As for proper and improper constituents: The concept of hydrogen is a 
proper constituent of the concept of H2O, whilst the concept of H2O is an 
improper constituent of H2O. Now, the notion of being more transparent than 
can be defined: 
 
(TranspDef.) 
Concept y is more transparent than concept x with respect to event-type e iff 
y consists of concepts picking out more properties that are relevant for e than y does.  
 
And this makes for a definition of reduction, taking into account that the 
reducing and the reduced concept as wholes (their improper constituents) 
have to pick out the same property, or that the corresponding expressions 
have the same intension, just like the concept of water and the concept of 
H2O as wholes presumably pick out the same property and ‛the property of 
being water’ and ‛the property of being H2O’ have the same intension: 
 
(RedDef) 
Expression x reduces to expression y with respect to event type e iff  
(i) the conceptual content of y is more transparent with respect to e than the conceptual  
content of x and 
(ii) x and y have the same intension. 
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In this sense, reduction is a sort of explanation-improvement. It is 
expression replacement to the effect that the conceptual contents of 
expressions become more transparent with respect to the explanatorily 
relevant properties. 5  
Explanation comes in degrees. Some explanations are better than others. 
An explanation of hydrogen-bond-involving events involving the concept 
of H2O is better than an explanation just using the concept of water. 
Nevertheless, an explanation of this latter type can be true, or correct. We 
now can answer the question in which sense reduction is concerned with 
explanation of one theory by another:  
An explanation of an event of destruction of hydrogen-bonds in terms of 
hydrogen-bonds and H2O can be used to explain why the corresponding 
explanation expressed in terms of folk-chemistry is true, if we add 
information of the following kind: Water is nothing but H2O.  
One might be a little bit upset by the fact that the reduction-relation turns 
out to be a four-place-relation (as far as expressions are concerned) or a 
                                                     
5 Similar considerations have inspired some philosophers to investigate levels of 
explanations as opposed to ontological levels. Unfortunately, these philosophers tend to 
conflate both ways of individuating levels of description. Peter Smith, for example, argues 
that the different levels of explanation corresponding to, say, psychology and neuroscience 
differ with respect to the taxonomies employed by these theories (Smith 1992). These 
taxonomies seem to be classifications on the level of event-types or properties, not on the 
level of conceptual contents. Adrian Cussins, who does not aim at illuminating the notion of 
reduction, but rather presupposes such a notion and tries to establish a notion of non-
reductive naturalism, claims that we should distinguish scientific levels according to 
understanding conditions (Cussins 1992, p.182) – which comes close to a level of conceptual 
contents – but he himself, at least sometimes, describes the difference of levels in terms of 
properties (ibid. p.179). Robert van Gulick seems to follow a similar line of thinking: He 
explicitly argues that the difference between a theory of the mental and neuroscience partly 
consists in the fact that the former contains concepts that cannot be expressed within the 
framework of the latter (van Gulick 1992, p. 163). In a more recent paper he describes 
reduction as the task of gaining a ‛mode of access with the alleged reducing representations’ 
that can be gained with the reduced representations (van Gulick 2001, p.14). Different modes 
of access correspond to different pragmatic dimensions of user-theory-relations (cf. van 
Gulick 1992, p. 166 f). Even though van Gulick discusses questions of theory-individuation 
in terms of concepts, the underlying metaphysics makes it difficult to understand the role 
these conceptual contents and modes of access play. He argues that even though the mental 
belongs to the domain of the physical, mental properties are not to be identified with 
physical properties. What the conceptual differences between both theories add to this 
metaphysical difference is hard to uncover. Since different theories can, according to van 
Gulick, deliver the same mode of access, a mode of access cannot deliver a criterion for 
concept-individuation and, therefore, not illuminate the role the conceptual differences play; 
different theories should at least contain different conceptual contents. Otherwise, the 
notion of reduction could easily be defined in terms of conceptual-content preserving 
translation.  
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three-place-relation (as far as conceptual contents are concerned), that is, 
that some term or concept reduces to another with respect to certain states of 
affairs or events. Isn’t there reduction simpliciter? Let me briefly argue 
against the possibility of reduction simpliciter. The notion of reduction 
seems to comprise an element of appropriateness of a concept. The concept 
of H2O is more appropriate than the concept of water. But nothing is 
appropriate simpliciter. Even though we can perfectly judge questions to be 
inappropriate, period – that is, we can use the one-place predicate ‛_is 
(in)appropriate’ to generate a well-formed sentence – the property of being 
(in)appropriate is nevertheless a relational property. Something is 
appropriate or inappropriate with respect to something. And just like no 
one is in love simpliciter, no expression reduces to another simpliciter. 
Nevertheless, there is an interesting kind of reduction that comes close to 
reduction simpliciter, a kind of reduction we should call more appropriately 
‛universal reduction’: A reduces to B universally iff for any event or state of 
affairs that possibly occurs in virtue of the property/the substance/the 
kind which both ‛A’ and ‛B’ refer to or can be used to ascribe, A reduces to 
B. This definition makes universal reduction conceptually dependent on 
reduction as outlined above.  
Before I go on, let me briefly comment on the question of how this sort of 
reduction relates to the metaphysical/explanatory-relation. I think that this 
sort of reduction is a sort of explanation-improvement in virtue of its being 
concerned with metaphysics. It is concerned with metaphysics not only in 
that it states identity claims. Furthermore it makes the criteria for 
explanation-improvement dependent on the nature of things – this nature 
corresponds to the different modes under which things are presented to us 
by different concepts. In causal contexts, ‛water’ reduces to ‛H2O’ because 
the concept of H2O informs us better about the causal nature of water, 
unlike the concept of water.  
 
Can we connect these insights to inter-theoretic relations? In order to do so, 
let me briefly comment on cases like the phlogiston-oxygen case. The 
relevant relation between the phlogiston theory and the oxygen theory is in 
many respects a mere historical one. Nevertheless, many philosophers 
would be ready to accept that, in one sense or another, the phlogiston 
theory actually has an explanatory power being closely related to the 
explanatory power of the oxygen theory (or that it fits a lot of data the 
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oxygen theory fits). I take this to mean that, if the phlogiston-theory were 
true, then it would explain at least part of what the oxygen-theory explains.  
But in fact it did not explain anything, for nothing can be explained by 
referring to a false theory. Mild reflection on the use of ‛because’ shows 
this: We are not ready to acknowledge that a sentence of the form ‛Q 
because P’ expresses a truth if P is wrong, and we do so for conceptual 
reasons. So, if the phlogiston theory did not explain anything, the 
interesting relation between the oxygen and the phlogiston theory seems to 
be based on counterfactual truths concerning the realm of phenomena both 
theories would explain. But for every kind of phenomena (e.g. those that are 
explained by the oxygen theory), there are infinitely many theories that 
would explain these phenomena (equally saving the data, though perhaps 
not equally well). It sounds odd to say that all these theories reduce to the 
oxygen theory in the sense of a theory-shift, a notion that guided many 
philosophers of science through their investigations of the notion of intra-
level reduction; therefore, if the phlogiston theory reduces to the oxygen 
theory, then this is to a relevant degree due to (important) historical and 
psychological reasons. A similar story can be told about corrections in the 
base theory; if a reduced theory is corrected by or in the base theory, it 
contains false parts the base theory does not contain. These parts have the 
same status as the phlogiston theory: They explain nothing and are 
replaced in the base theory. I mention this notion of theory-succession-
reduction because this concept is sometimes conflated with the sort of 
reduction I try to outline.6  
To define a non-historical notion of intertheoretic reduction, we should 
accept that false (parts of) theories do not reduce to true (parts of) theories. 
To sketch the basic idea, consider the following (schemas of) general claims 
which I use as dummies for (schemas of) sentences expressing natural laws 
whatsoever:  
 
1) nom x (x is water  Gx) 
                                                     
6 Here are two examples: David Charles and Kathleen Lennon describe reduction as follows: 
‛Reductionist accounts aim to show that where we thought we had two sets of concepts, 
entities, laws, explanations, or properties, we in fact have only one […]’ (Charles & Lennon 
1992, p.2, my italics). Tim Crane also refers to epistemic subjects: ‛[W]e start off with the 
‛target’ entity, X, and find a reason for identifying X with Y.’ (Crane 2001, p. 54) This version 
of reduction seems to underlie slogans like ‛if As reduce to Bs, then As do not exist over and 
above Bs’, since this slogan is telling just in case someone actually thought that As exist over 
and above Bs.  
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2) nom x (x is H2O  G*x) 
 
Assume that both sentences express truths. The former reduces to the latter, 
because there is a function mapping the non-logical constants of the former 
onto non-logical constants of the latter. This function is governed by the 
following principle:  
 
(TheorRedPrinc) 
Map all the relevant sense bearing constants of the reducing theory onto the constants they 
reduce to – in the abovementioned sense – or to themselves in the base theory.   
 
A theory reduces to another iff such a function can be found. Now, we can 
define inter-level theory-reduction as follows: 
 
Theory A reduces to theory B iff A has a logical structure of B* (B* being identical to B or to 
a substructure of B) and there is a set of functions such that these functions map all the 
constants of A onto themselves in B* or, if they do not occur in B*, onto constants they 
reduce to.  
 
Whether or not we want to allow extensions of A in B (such that B contains 
expressions being neither contained by A nor being the reducers of any 
member of A), as this definition does, is rather a matter of taste or purpose 
than of conceptual considerations concerning reduction. Note that the 
notion of a theory used here must not be identified with classical views of 
theories. The theories I talk about are interpreted theories in the sense that 
their sense-bearing constituents have a hyper-intension. (For a sketch of a 
model of hyper-intension, see below.) 
This sort of theory reduction can be applied not only to reduction of folk-
theory to scientific-theory, but also to intra-scientific inter-level-reductions. 
Biology, for example, reduces to chemistry in this sense iff (i) the ontology 
of chemistry contains a subclass being equivalent to the ontology of biology 
and (ii) the conceptual content of the language of chemistry presents us 
with this ontology in a more appropriate way – that is: it presents us with 
more causally relevant properties.7  
                                                     
7 Let me add another observation: If dependence-relations between properties are relevant 
for the notion of reduction, then it is with respect to the properties corresponding to the 
mode of presentation, not with respect to the properties the concepts pick out as wholes. It is 
not the case that the property of water depends (in an interesting sense of ‛depends’) on the 
property of H2O. But the properties corresponding to the mode of presentation of the 
concept of water, maybe some phenomenal properties, are dependent on the properties 
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3. Semantic approaches 
According to classical semantic approaches to intertheoretic reduction, 
reduction is not based on syntactic properties. Nevertheless, these 
approaches face another problem. As Suppe pointed out, we should regard 
‛theory individuation issues as make or break for any account of theories’ 
(Suppe 2000, p. 109). According to my view, theories (or better: the entities 
in virtue of which theories reduce) should be individuated very fine 
grained; it is within the realm of Fregean senses that we have to look for the 
individuating criteria. If we do not, a water-theory does not semantically 
differ from an H2O-theory, and, therefore, cannot be reduced to the latter. 
As long as conceptual differences, that is: differences on the level of hyper-
intensional entities, cannot be explained in terms of model-theory, model-
theoretic approaches fail to explain what theory reduction consists in. This 
is because of the fact that model-theory takes the primary role of 
predicates, like ‛_ is water’ and ‛_ is H2O’ to consist in picking out Carnap-
inspired intensions rather than hyper-intensions. They are unable to mark 
the difference between, say, the proposition that is expressed by ‛iron is a 
metal’ and the proposition that is expressed by ‛Fe is a metal’. Nevertheless, 
one might hope, as I do, that there is a way of developing individuating 
criteria for conceptual contents using set-theoretical notions. There are at 
least two accounts on offer, both of which lead to untenable results. Since 
an appropriate discussion of these accounts would take too much space, I 
will just point to the main problem they face in a footnote and briefly 
sketch an alternative.  
This alternative starts with a pre-theoretic understanding of the notion of a 
mode of presentation and rests on the assumption that a concept’s mode of 
presentation is what makes for the concept’s identity. I take a mode of 
presentation to be something that presents us with the world as if there are 
objects/is an object, and these objects/this object as having or lacking 
certain properties. Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, let us take 
properties to be functions from worlds to extensions (the approach will 
work for any model that describes properties in terms of set-theory).  
                                                                                                                                       
corresponding to the mode of presentation of the concept of H2O. Water is tasteless for us 
(at least in part) in virtue of having its chemical structure. 
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Now, if we take the function of conceptual contents of a singular term or a 
predicate to have a certain mode of presentation, and if we subscribe to the 
thesis that properties are individuated by functions from possible worlds to 
extensions, and if we accept that for any concept A, for any concept B, B=A 
iff A and B have the same mode of presentation, then for any basic concept, 
for any expression expressing this concept, the expression’s intension 
determines the basic concept that is expressed. To put it differently: No two 
expressions that have the same intension and express basic concepts can 
express different concepts. Basic concepts, being unanalyzable, present us 
with things as if there is/are something/some things and this thing/these 
things as having exactly one property. I take this to be a conceptual point 
about the notion of a mode of presentation and the notion of a basic 
concept.  
Now, we can take the conceptual content of an expression that expresses a 
complex conceptual content (its hyper-intension) to be a structure of 
intensions corresponding to basic concepts forming the complex concept. 
This structure contains some of the intensions determining (or being equal 
to) the properties that are picked out by the complex concept. These concepts 
have to be structured appropriately: If C is a concept being composed of the 
three basic concepts f, f* and f+ such that something falls under C in a 
world w iff (i) it falls under f and f* in w or (ii) if it falls under f+ in w, then 
the hyper-intension of an expression expressing C is the following 
structure:  
 
<<f, f*, f’+>, {x, y, y*, y+, w: (x falls under y in world w & x falls under y* in world w)  x 
falls under y+ in world w}>  
 
An entity x falls under a function from worlds to extensions f in a world w 
iff f assigns value v (an extension) to w and x is a member of v, that is: if it 
has the corresponding property in w. This hyper-intension determines the 
intension and the extension of any expression having this hyper-intension.8  
                                                     
8 The abovementioned two alternatives do not start with basic concepts, but with basic or 
simple expressions. David Chalmers’ version of two-dimensionalism allows for a model of 
something very similar to hyper-intensions. A sentence’s hyper-intension could be modelled 
as a structure of primary intensions (functions from scenarios to extensions) of the 
sentence’s constituents. (Chalmers 2006). The problem is that a sentence’s constituents (the 
simple expressions) not necessarily mimic the semantic structure they have: A simple 
expression can express complex conceptual contents. Chalmers introduces these structured 
intensions in order to distinguish between the semantics of pairs of expressions of the 
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So, a hyper-intension of an expression E is a structure containing functions 
from possible worlds to extensions (corresponding to the properties the 
primitive concepts pick out) and a relation that defines how the basic 
concepts relate to the members of the concept’s extensions in worlds.  
Basic sentences can be taken to contain two such structures – the structure 
of a singular term and of a predicate:  
 
<<singular term>,<predicate>> 
 
Complex sentences are n-tupels of pairs of hyper-intensions of singular 
terms and predicates and a relation that defines the composition of these 
basic sentences’ hyper-intensions. I do not have the space here to go into 
this in detail. But I hope that this roughly sketched drawing illuminates the 
relation between this sort of semantics and the notion of reduction outlined 
above. If we take theories to be syntactic entities that have hyper-
intensions, we can describe reduction as follows: A reduced theory’s hyper-
intensions deliver new functions or properties, and these functions or 
properties are more relevant than the properties delivered by the hyper-
intensions of the reducing theory, even though the theories’ intensions are 
equivalent. According to the paradigmatic cases that guided the discussion, 
the mind reduces to the physical in this sense, if it reduces at all.  
 
 
Conclusion 
I briefly outlined a serious problem which many accounts of intertheoretic 
reduction face: They cannot explain why a theory reduces to another. The 
                                                                                                                                       
following kind: ‛7+3’ and ‛10’. Let me stipulate that ‛10*’ is a simple expression that has the 
same meaning as ‛7+3’. The difference between the semantic value of ‛10*’ and the semantic 
value of ‛10’ cannot be drawn along the line of structured primary intensions of simple 
expressions – the simple expressions have the same primary intension. Furthermore, both 
expressions have the same extensions such that an alternative way Chalmers suggested – 
taking senses of basic expressions to be pairs of primary intensions and extensions (ibid.) – 
is blocked. 
Cresswell’s account of structured propositions has several problems stemming from the 
same source (Cresswell 1985). According to Cresswell, a proposition (the second relatum of, 
say, a belief-relation) can be modelled as a structured set of ordinary intensions of simple 
expressions. Therefore, we are unable to mark a difference not only between the semantic 
values of ‛10*’ and ‛10’. Additionally, the conceptual contents of ‛iron’ and ‛Fe’ turn out to be 
identical, since both expressions are (i) simple and (ii) have the same intension. But they 
have different conceptual contents. So, we should not focus on simple expressions and their 
senses to look for the furniture of structured meanings. 
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account outlined in the present paper can answer this question: The 
concepts expressed by elements of the base theory are more relevant with 
respect to the phenomena the theory seeks to explain than the elements of 
the reduced theory. Furthermore, this account can explain the epistemic 
relevance of this kind of reduction: It is the project of making explanations 
more appropriate by pointing to the explanatorily relevant properties 
which were not available in the reduced theory.  
Note that the concept of reduction does not include a certain stance on the 
question of what actually is the fundamental level. An idealist can use the 
term in the same way to state his theses as the physicalist can do. Therefore, 
no physical concept of causation enters into this concept, nor does the 
concept presuppose a certain hierarchy of scientific levels.  
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